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1 Introduction
Many countries have experienced bubble-like dynamics. The boom-bust in
asset prices in equity markets tends to be associated with the boom-crash of
land or housing markets, which, in turn, has large eects on real economic
activity. Notable examples include the U.S. before and after the nancial
crisis of 2007{2008 and Japan from the late 1980s to the beginning of the
1990s.1 The episodes in these countries suggest that nancial markets are
connected to each other, in the sense that the boom and collapse in one asset
market has contagious eects on other asset markets.
In this paper, we theoretically investigate contagious eects of asset price
bubbles on the other asset market. For this purpose, we incorporate a bubble-
asset into the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Following traditional
literature such as Tirole (1985), this asset produces no real dividend, i.e., the
fundamental value of the asset is zero. One interpretation of the asset is that
an equity with no dividends circulates. We rst show that the dynamic inter-
actions between bubble-asset price, land price, and output generate powerful
bubbly dynamics. Second, the boom-bust cycles in bubble-asset price cause
boom-crash cycles in the land market simultaneously, like a contagion, by
aecting the fundamentals of land.
Figure 1 shows the mechanisms of the dynamic interactions in a bubbly
episode. Output, land price, and bubble-asset price interact with each other
not only within a period, but also between periods. This dynamic interaction
between asset prices and aggregate quantity is similar to the Kiyotaki-Moore
model. The key innovation of our paper is that the presence of bubbles
enhances this interaction, increasing investment, output, consumption, and
land price compared to the bubbleless economy. Once a bubble collapses,
a reversal mechanism operates. Investment, output, consumption, and land
price all fall eventually.
[Insert Figure 1]
A feature of bubbly equilibrium is that bubbles aect the land market
by changing fundamentals of land itself, i.e., cash ows from land. In the
bubbleless economy, land allocation is inecient, in the sense that even un-
productive entrepreneurs use land to produce goods as in Kiyotaki and Moore
1See Brunnermeier (2009) for the U.S. experiences and see Ueda (2011) for Japan's
case.
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(1997). As a result, output, investment, consumption, TFP, and land price
are all low in the steady-state bubbleless economy. Bubbles not only in-
crease the net worth of entrepreneurs facing the borrowing constraint, but
also improve land allocation, i.e., more land is used in productive sectors.
This improves cash ows from land and increases land price, which in turn
relaxes credit limits, thereby generating expansionary eects.
Although bubbles improve resource allocation and produce expansionary
eects, are they welfare-improving or welfare-reducing? We also investigate
welfare eects of bubbles. Traditional wisdom such as Tirole (1985) suggests
that bubbles are welfare-improving. In his framework, although bubbles
increase consumption, they are contractionary in investment and output.
On the other hand, Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) shows that bubbles are
welfare-reducing. In their model, consumption, investment, and output all
decrease by bubbles. This contractionary view has been criticized, because
it seems to be inconsistent during bubbly episodes. We investigate welfare
eects within a framework in which bubbles are expansionary in all three
variables. Kocherlakota (2009) also examines welfare eects of bubble in the
expansionary case. The dierence between his analysis and ours is that we
consider welfare eects including transitional dynamics, while he focuses on
welfare in the steady state.
Our paper is related to a number of recent theoretical studies on rational
asset price bubbles. Since a seminal paper by Farhi and Tirole (2009), the
recent literature have provided a theoretical framework to analyze expansion-
ary eects of asset price bubbles. Examples include Hirano and Yanagawa
(2010a, 2010b), Martin and Ventura (2010, 2011), Aoki and Nikolov (2011),
Ventura (2011), Miao and Wang (2012), and Sakuragawa (2012).2 These
studies only have one asset market, bubble-asset market.3 Dierent from
these studies, our model has two asset markets, bubble-asset market and
land market. Thus, we can analyze interactions between two asset markets,
and investigate contagious eect of changes in the bubble-asset market on
the land market.
Kocherlakota (2009) and Miller and Stiglitz (2010) are closely related to
our study, in the sense that they examine the eects of boom-bust cycles of
bubbles in the Kiyotaki-Moore model. There are signicant dierences. In
2Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford (1997), and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009)
analyze asset price bubbles in an endowment economy with an innitely lived agent.
3The model of Miao and Wang (2012) only has equity markets. The equity prices
include a bubble component.
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Kocherlakota's model, land is not used as a factor of production and does not
produce any output, i.e., the fundamental value of land is zero. He analyzes
the case of positive land price as a bubbly economy. On the other hand, in
our model, land is used as a factor of production. Miller and Stiglitz describe
bubbles as corrective error of forecast on land price. In contrast, our model
is based on a rational bubble model.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a basic model
and then derive the existence condition of bubbles. We also compare the
bubble economy to the bubbleless economy in the steady state. In section 3,
we analyze bubbly dynamics and discuss the welfare implications of bubble.
2 The Model
We develop an innitely lived agent model in which the nancial market is
imperfect. Our model is based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
2.1 Entrepreneur's Problem
Consider a discrete-time economy with a continuum of entrepreneurs. A
typical entrepreneur has the following expected discounted utility:
E0
" 1X
t=0
t log cit
#
; (1)
where i is the index for each entrepreneur and cit is his or her consumption
in period t.  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor and E0 [] is the
conditional expectation on information at the beginning of period 0.
In each period, each entrepreneur has high production opportunities to
produce the homogeneous goods (hereinafter H-projects) with probability
p, and low production ones (L-projects) with probability 1   p.4 Both
high- and low-productivity entrepreneurs (hereafter, H-entrepreneurs and L-
entrepreneurs) use land and intermediate goods as inputs to produce the
homogeneous goods. The land has a xed supply, which is normalized to be
one. The intermediate goods fully depreciate one period after production.
4A similar setting is used in Woodford (1990), Kiyotaki (1998), Kiyotaki and Moore
(2008), and Kocherlakota (2009).
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The production technologies are as follows:
yit+1 = 
i
t

kit

 
zit
1  
1 
; (2)
where kit( 0) is land, zit( 0) is intermediate goods in period t; and yit+1
is output in period t + 1. it is productivity in period t. 
i
t = 
H if the
entrepreneur has H-projects, and it = 
L if he or she has L-projects. We
assume H > L. The probability p is exogenous and independent across
entrepreneurs and over time. At the beginning of each period t, the en-
trepreneur knows his or her own type in period t, whether he or she has
H-projects or L-projects. Assuming that the initial population measures of
H-types and L-types are p and 1   p, respectively, the population measures
in subsequent periods are the same.
In this economy, we introduce bubbles. We dene a bubble-asset as an
asset that produces no real return, i.e., the fundamental value of the asset
is zero. Let Pt be the per unit price of bubble-asset in period t in terms
of consumption goods. Then, the entrepreneur's ow of funds constraint is
given by
cit + qt(k
i
t   kit 1) + zit + Pt(xit   xit 1) + rt 1bit 1 + qtkit 1 = yit + bit; (3)
where xit is the amount of bubble-asset purchased in period t. The left
hand side of (3) shows expenditure on consumption, net purchase of land,
investment of intermediate goods, net purchase of bubble-asset, repayment,
and maintenance costs. As in Lorenzoni (2008), we assume that in order
to keep the land productive, each entrepreneur must pay maintenance costs
for a proportion  of his or her land holdings. The right-hand side shows
the available funds in period t, which includes the return from investment
in the previous period and new borrowing. We dene the net worth of the
entrepreneur in period t as eit  yit   rt 1bit 1 + qtkit 1(1  ) + Ptxit 1.
We assume that because of frictions in the nancial market, the en-
trepreneurs are credit-constrained. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
creditors limit credit so that debt repayment cannot exceed the value of col-
lateral, i.e., the value of the land minus maintenance costs. That is, the
borrowing constraint becomes
rtb
i
t  qt+1kit   qt+1kit; (4)
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where qt+1 is the price of land in period t+1. rt and b
i
t are the gross interest
rate and the amount of borrowing in period t, respectively.
We also impose a short sale constraint on bubble-asset:5
xit  0: (5)
2.2 Equilibrium
Let us denote the aggregate consumption of H- and L-entrepreneurs in period
t as
P
i2Ht c
i
t  CHt and
P
i2Lt c
i
t  CLt ; respectively, where Ht and Lt are
families of H- and L-entrepreneurs in period t. Similarly, let
P
i2Ht z
i
t  ZHt ;P
i2Lt z
i
t  ZLt ;
P
i2Ht b
i
t  BHt ;
P
i2Lt b
i
t  BLt ;
P
i2Ht k
i
t  KHt ;
P
i2Lt k
i
t 
KLt ;
P
i2Ht[Lt x
i
t  Xt; and
P
i2Ht[Lt y
i
t  Yt be aggregate investment, aggre-
gate borrowing, aggregate land holdings, and aggregate demand for bubble-
asset of each type, respectively. Assuming that the aggregate supply of
bubble-asset is xed over time X; then the market clearing conditions for
goods, credit, land, and bubble-asset are, respectively,
CHt + C
L
t + Z
H
t + Z
L
t = Yt   qt; (6)
BHt +B
L
t = 0; (7)
KHt +K
L
t = 1; (8)
Xt = X: (9)
The competitive equilibrium is dened as a set of prices frt; qt; Ptg1t=0 and
quantities

cit; b
i
t; z
i
t; x
i
t; k
i
t; C
H
t ; C
L
t ; B
H
t ; B
L
t ; Z
H
t ; Z
L
t ; K
H
t ; K
L
t ; Yt
	1
t=0
, such that
(i) the market clearing conditions, (6)-(9) are satised, and (ii) each en-
trepreneur chooses consumption, borrowing, land holdings, investment of
intermediate goods, and bubble-asset to maximize his or her expected dis-
counted utility (1) under the constraints (2), (3), (4), and (5). Because there
is no aggregate uncertainty, the entrepreneurs have perfect foresight of future
prices and aggregate quantities in equilibrium. We also rule out the explosion
in land price:
lim
t!1
qt(1  )t
r0r1r2    rt 1 = 0: (10)
5Kocherlakota (1992) shows that the short sale constraint plays an important role for
the emergence asset price bubbles in an innitely lived agent model.
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As is well known, there are multiple equilibria in the rational bubble
model. One is the equilibria with Pt > 0; the other is Pt = 0: In the rest of
the analysis, we focus on Pt > 0 and analyze what happens in the bubble
economy.
2.3 Entrepreneur's Behavior
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium behavior of en-
trepreneurs in the bubble economy. We consider the case
L
ut
< rt <
H
ut
; (11)
where ut  qt qt+1(1 )=rt is the opportunity cost, or user cost, of holding
land from t to t + 1: L=ut and 
H=ut are the rates of return of L-projects
and H-projects, respectively.
In order that bubble-asset be held in equilibrium, the rate of return of
bubble-asset must be equal to the interest rate:
rt =
Pt+1
Pt
: (12)
When (11) and (12) hold, both the borrowing constraint and the short
sale constraint simultaneously become binding for entrepreneurs who have
H-projects in period t, but not for entrepreneurs who have L-projects. Since
the utility function is logarithmic, each entrepreneur consumes a fraction
1   of the net worth in each period, that is,
cit = (1  )

yit   rt 1bit 1 + qtkit 1(1  ) + Ptxit 1

: (13)
Then, by using (3), (4), and (5), we can derive demand functions of the
type i agent of H-entrepreneurs for intermediate goods and land holdings in
period t:
zit = (1  )

yit   rt 1bit 1 + qtkit 1(1  ) + Ptxit 1

; (14)
kit =


yit   rt 1bit 1 + qtkit 1(1  ) + Ptxit 1

qt   qt+1(1  )
rt
: (15)
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Equation (14) indicates that H-entrepreneur spends a fraction 1    of his
or her savings on intermediate goods. Equation (15) indicates that H-
entrepreneur spends a fraction  of his or her savings to nance the dif-
ference between the land value qt and the collateral value qt+1(1   )=rt.6
The dierence qt   qt+1(1  )=rt is the down payment to purchase one unit
of land, and is the user cost ut: The entrepreneurs buy bubble-asset when
they have L-projects, and sell them when they have opportunities to invest
in H-projects. As a result, their net worth increases (compared to bubbleless
cases), which boosts their demand for intermediate goods and land as shown
in (14) and (15).
L-entrepreneurs in period t prefer buying bubble-asset and lending to H-
entrepreneurs instead of investing in their own L-projects when (11) and (12)
hold because the rate of return of bubble-asset or lending is greater than the
rate of return of L-projects.
2.4 Aggregation
Since (14) and (15) are linear functions of net worth, we can the aggregate
across H-entrepreneurs to derive the aggregate demand functions:
ZHt = (1  )p [Yt + qt(1  ) + PtX] ; (16)
KHt =
p
qt   qt+1(1  )
rt
[Yt + qt(1  ) + PtX] ; (17)
where Yt + qt(1   ) + PtX is the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs.
Since every entrepreneur has the same chance to take on H-projects in each
period, a proportion p of aggregate wealth is the wealth of H-entrepreneurs.
Equation (16) and (17) indicate that the aggregate demand functions for
intermediate goods and land depend upon cash ow from investments in the
previous period Yt as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and land price qt as
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). What is new in our framework is that the
demand functions also depend upon bubble-asset price Pt, i.e., the presence
6This is a popular demand function under nancial constraint problems such as
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1999), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997), and Matsuyama (2007). The dierence between these literature
and our paper is that the presence of asset bubbles aect the net worth of entrepreneurs.
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of bubbles increases demands for land holdings and intermediate goods, does
not crowds them out as in traditional literature (Tirole (1985)).
Since only H-entrepreneurs use land, from the land market clearing con-
dition,
p [Yt + qt(1  ) + PtX]
qt   qt+1(1  )
rt
= 1: (18)
Note that qt is an increasing function of Pt; Yt; and qt+1. When Pt increases,
the net worth of H-entrepreneurs improves. As a result, they can buy more
land with maximum leverage, which raises the current land price qt. More-
over, when qt+1 is expected to increase, the borrowing constraint is relaxed,
which increases the demand for land, as in the model of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). In our model, qt+1 is aected by the bubble-asset price in period
t+ 1; Pt+1:
From the aggregate ow of funds constraint of L-entrepreneurs and the
market clearing condition for bubble-asset (9), we can derive the equilibrium
the bubble-asset price in period t:
PtX =
(1  p) [Yt + qt(1  )] BHt
1   + p (19)
We see that given BHt , Pt is an increasing function of Yt and qt. Intuitively,
when cash ow or land price increases, the net worth of L-entrepreneurs
improves and they can buy more bubble-asset, which raises the bubble-asset
price.
Note that from (18) and (19), bubble-asset price Pt and land price qt
reinforce each other within a period. Moreover, as we will see, since both asset
prices are forward-looking variables, they interact with each other between
periods.
Since only H-entrepreneurs produce by using land and intermediate goods,
output evolves over time as
Yt+1 =
H

u1 t : (20)
From the denition of the user cost of land and equation (12), the land
price should satisfy the dynamic equation
qt = ut +
Pt
Pt+1
qt+1(1  ): (21)
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From this, the current land price equals the discounted value of future user
costs, which in turn depends on the discounted value of future output from
(20). This means that when output is expected to increase in the future,
the current land price rises. Additionally, future output is aected by the
presence of bubbles.
Since both H- and L-entrepreneurs consume a fraction 1    of the net
worth, goods market clearing condition (6) can be written as
(1  )At + 1  

ut = Yt   qt; (22)
where At  Yt + qt(1  ) + PtX is aggregate wealth: The rst term on the
left hand side of (22) is aggregate consumption and the second is investment
of intermediate goods.
Along the perfect foresight equilibrium path, aggregate wealth evolves
over time as
At+1 =
H
ut
pAt +
Pt+1
Pt
(1  p)At: (23)
Equation (23) indicates that given the aggregate savings of the economy At,
the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs earns a rate of return H=ut ;
while the net worth of L-entrepreneurs earns Pt+1=Pt:
2.5 Steady State Analysis
In order for bubbles to exist in the steady state, the following two conditions
must be satised:
L
u
 1; (24)
P > 0: (25)
(24) indicates that the rate of return of one unit of bubble-asset must be
greater than the rate of return of L-projects. Otherwise, no entrepreneur buys
bubble-asset. (25) indicates that the bubble-asset price must be positive.
This second condition is satised as long as L-entrepreneurs produce in the
10
bubbleless economy, which means K 0Lt > 0.
7 From these conditions, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Bubbles can exist if and only if the following condition is
satised:
H  
Lp
1   + p ; (26)
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix A.
In order for bubbles to exist in the steady-state equilibrium, productivity
H must be suciently high. Intuitively, if productivity is high enough, the
marginal productivity of production becomes lower, which means that the
user cost becomes suciently large that the rate of return of bubble-asset
becomes greater than the rate of return of L-projects.
We should add a few more remarks on maintenance costs. As in tradi-
tional rational bubble literature such as Tirole (1985) and Farhi and Tirole
(2011), in the steady-state bubble economy with no growth, the interest rate
equals one, in which case (10) cannot be satised in our model because our
model has a xed asset, land. In order that (10) is satised, we must intro-
duce costs associated with land holdings.
Proposition 2 Output, investment, consumption, and aggregate TFP are
all higher in the bubbly steady state than in the bubbleless steady state.
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix B.
In the steady state of the bubbleless economy,8 production is inecient in
the sense that L-entrepreneurs as well as H-entrepreneurs produce by using
land and intermediate goods, which means that resource allocation is ine-
cient. On the other hand, in the bubbly steady state, only H-entrepreneurs
produce. This means that a bubble increases eciency in production by elim-
inating inecient L-projects, thus improving aggregate TFP. In other words,
7The condition that L-entrepreneurs produce in the bubbleless economy is the following:
1  p(1  )  p 
L
L   (1  ) [Hp+ L(1  p)] > 0:
If this condition is satised, Pt > 0 holds true.
8The mathematical description in the bubbleless economy is in the proof of Proposition
2 in the appendix.
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the presence of bubbles helps transfer resources from L-entrepreneurs to H-
entrepreneurs. Since resource allocation is more ecient, all macroeconomic
variables are higher than those in the bubbleless steady state.
With regard to the eects of a bubble on land price, since only H-
entrepreneurs produce in the bubbly steady state, cash ow from land in-
creases from the present to the future, which raises the steady-state land
price. On the other hand, the interest rate is high in the bubbly steady
state, which decreases land price.9 In this sense, there are two competing
eects of a bubble on land price. Which of these eects dominates depends
on the value of :10 In the following example, we focus on the case where a
bubble increases land price in the steady state.
An interesting feature in our framework is that bubbles changes funda-
mentals itself, i.e., cash ow from land and interest rate. When the land
price is higher in the bubble economy, it reects an improvement in cash
ow, and this improvement is supported by the presence of bubbles. This
implies that boom-bust in bubble-asset price is associated with dramatic
changes in fundamentals of land.
3 Macroeconomic Eects of Asset Bubbles
Given an initial condition Y0, the perfect foresight equilibrium path is de-
scribed by sequences fqt; At; rt; ut; Pt; Ytg1t=0, satisfying (10), (20), (21), (22),
and (23). With regard to this dynamical system, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 There is a saddle point path on which the economy converges
to a steady-state bubble economy.
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix C.
9In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the interest rate equals the gatherers' time preference
rate and becomes constant over time, even if productivity shocks occur, while in our model,
the interest rate changes endogenously whether bubbles occur or not.
10There is a threshold value of   ^ < 1; above which bubbles increase the steady-state
land value and below which they decrease it. ^ satises the following equation:
q =
u

> q0 =
r0u0
r0   (1  ) ;
where u0 denotes the user cost of holding land in the bubbleless economy.
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Once the economy gets on the saddle point path, the economy's output
dynamics can be described as the following simple dierence equation:
Yt+1 =
H

(
p
1   + p )
1 (Yt)1 ; (27)
and equilibrium land price, bubble-asset price, and user cost follow
qt =
p

Yt
1   + p ; (28)
PtX =
[1  (1  )p]    p

Yt
1   + p ; (29)
ut =
pYt
1   + p : (30)
What is happening during bubbly dynamics is as follows. Suppose that cash
ow at date t increases. Together with this increase in cash ow, the net
worth of H-and L-entrepreneurs improves, and their demand for land and
their demand for bubbles also increase. As a result, both land price and
bubble price at date t rise, reinforcing each other. Because of this, the net
worth of H-entrepreneurs at date t improves furthermore, which produces
further increase in output, the net worth, land price and bubble price at
date t+ 1. These knock-on eects continue not only in period t; but also in
periods t + 1; t + 2;   : Moreover, this anticipated increase in land price in
periods t+1; t+2;    is reected by an increase in land price at date t; which
aects bubble price at date t once again: In equilibrium, all these mechanisms
occur simultanously, and the economy runs according to (27)-(30).
The two-way feedback between asset prices and aggregate quantities op-
erates as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The key innovation of our paper is
that the presence of bubbles enhances this two-way interaction, thus increas-
ing output and land price compared to the bubbleless economy.
Since we obtain the analytical solutions of the equilibrium path, we can
analyze the output dynamics. In Figure 2, we show the equilibrium dynamics
of output in bubble and bubbleless economies. Suppose that the economy is
initially in a bubbleless steady state, Y bubbleless, and suddenly people believe
that a bubble has emerged and will exist with a positive price forever. The
output gets larger and converges to the steady state in the bubble economy
Y bubble.
[Insert Figure 2]
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3.1 Numerical Example
We show a numerical experiment on the eects of boom-bust in the bubble-
asset price on macroeconomic variables.11 For t  0, the economy is in the
steady state in the bubbleless economy, in which all entrepreneurs believe
that the bubble-asset price will be zero in the future: Pt = 0 for all t.
We suppose that at the beginning of period t = 1, the bubble-asset price
unexpectedly becomes positive Pt > 0, and all entrepreneurs expect that
the bubble will last forever. At the beginning of period t = 51, the bubble
collapses unexpectedly Pt = 0, and once the bubble bursts, all entrepreneurs
expect that the bubble will not emerge at all in the future. Note that there is
no aggregate productivity shock for all t. The model is solved by the shooting
method. The parameter values are set as follows: H = 1; L = :8;  = :99;
 = :2; p = :05;  = :3; X = 1. Most of these values appear standard.
Figure 3 plots the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables when a bub-
ble occurs. Consumption rises immediately after the emergence of the bubble
in period t = 1 and continues to increase over time because of the wealth
eect. Recall that consumption is a fraction 1  of net worth and net worth
improves over time. Output remains unchanged in period t = 1 because it is
predetermined. However, in period t = 2, it expands because of the realloca-
tion of land, i.e., land is used only by H-entrepreneurs in the bubbly economy
(t  1). After t = 3, since the bubble continues to improve the net worth
of H-entrepreneurs. This improvement enhances the crowd-in eect, output,
expenditure of intermediate goods, and land price over time. We emphasize
that the increase in land price reects an improvement in fundamentals (or
cash ow from land). Both land price and expenditure for intermediate goods
in period t = 1 decline immediately after the emergence of a bubble. This is
because when the bubble arises, the entrepreneurs buy bubble-asset, which
crowds savings away from the purchase of land and intermediate goods.12
This means that when the bubble rst appears, the traditional crowd-out
eect of the bubble dominates the crowd-in eect in the land market and
intermediate goods market.
When the bubble bursts in period t = 51, a reverse mechanism operates.
11It is not necessary to show the numerical experiment in order to show the dynamics of
output. However, to show the welfare analysis later, the simulation of a numerical example
in the transition path is needed.
12Immediately after bubbles arise, the interest rate rises substantially, reecting the
tightness of the credit market. This decreases the land price.
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The net worth of entrepreneurs decreases over time and land is used inef-
ciently, which means that L-entrepreneurs as well as H-entrepreneurs pro-
duce. As a result, output, consumption, expenditure of intermediate goods,
and land price all fall and converge to the lower, steady-state level.13 Our
simulation result suggests that the boom-bust cycles in bubble-asset price
cause boom-crash cycles in the land price simultaneously, like a contagion.
[Insert Figure 3]
Here we add a few remarks on the response of land price and expenditure
for intermediate goods. In this numerical example, we investigate the pure
eects of bubbles; the birth and burst of a bubble is caused by a sudden
change in entrepreneurs' expectations. If the emergence and collapse of a
bubble is triggered by a change in productivity H ; land price and expendi-
ture for intermediate goods will increase immediately after the emergence of
the bubble, then will decline immediately after the bubble crashes.
3.2 Welfare Eects of Bubbles
A bubble's appearance has positive eects on macroeconomic variables. In
this subsection, we discuss the welfare eects of asset price bubbles. We
compare the ex-ante welfare of entrepreneurs under two situations. As in
the previous numerical example, until period t  0, the economy is in the
steady-state of the bubbleless economy. In one situation, at the beginning
of period t = 1, a bubble arises and after period t  1; the economy runs
on the bubbly economy's path. In the other situation, a bubble never arises
for all t  0 and the economy continues to stay in the steady state of the
bubbleless economy.
When we compute the ex-ante welfare in period t = 1;
V i1 = E1
" 1X
t=1
t 1 log cit
#
= E1
" 1X
t=1
t 1 log(1  )eit
#
where V i1 is ex-ante welfare of the type i entrepreneur in period t = 1. Since
13Note that land price and expenditure for intermediate goods increase immediately
after the bubble bursts because all the savings of entrepreneurs ow to the purchase of
land and intermediate goods, causing the interest rate to fall substantially.
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eit+1 = R
i
te
i
t; the above equation can be rewritten as
V i1 =
1X
t=1
t 1 log(1  )t 1 + 1
1   log e
i
1 +

1   logR
i
1
+E1
" 1X
t=2
t
1   logR
i
t
#
; (31)
where, in the bubble economy,
Rit =
(
H
ut
if i = H;
Pt+1
Pt
if i = L;
and where, in the bubbleless economy,
Rit =
(
H
u0t
if i = H;
L
u0t
if i = L:
u0 denotes the user cost of holding land in the bubbleless economy. When we
compute the ex-ante welfare welfare, how much net worth the entrepreneur
has at date ei1, and how much he/she earns marginally in each period,
fRitg1t=1 ; have persistent eects on consumption in the future through aect-
ing the net worth. The second term in equation (31) captures the discounted
sum of the eect of ei1 on each period utility. The third term is the discounted
sum of the eect of Ri1; and the fourth term is the discounted sum of the
eect of fRitg1t=2 on each period expected utility.
We make two assumptions to compute ex-ante welfare in period t = 1.
The rst assumption is that at the beginning of period t = 1; each en-
trepreneur is endowed with X units of the bubble-asset. The second assump-
tion is that we use the third term and the fourth term in (31) for computing
the ex-ante welfare. When a bubble occurs at the beginning of period t = 1,
the bubble-asset price jumps up, but land price jumps down as shown in the
numerical example. Hence, the eect of a bubble's emergence on the net
worth in period t = 1 (the second term in (31)) is theoretically ambiguous.
However, in our numerical example, every individual's net worth in period
t = 1 improves. Thus, it is not surprising that the eect of a bubble's ap-
pearance raises the welfare if we include the second term in (31). Since the
rst term is the same for all entrepreneurs, it is unnecessary to compare the
levels of welfare. Therefore, we exclude the rst two terms.
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When computing the bubble economy, we take into account transitional
dynamics from the steady state of the bubbleless economy to the steady state
of the bubble economy. The parameter values are the same as before.
[Insert Figure 4]
Figure 4 plots the values of ex-ante welfare for H-entrepreneur in period 1
and L-entrepreneur in period 1, respectively. We compute their ex-ante wel-
fare with respect to p. The rst row shows the ex-ante welfare in the bubble
economy, while the second row shows the ex-ante welfare in the bubbleless
economy.
[Insert Figure 5]
Figure 5 shows the dierence of ex-ante welfare for them between bubble
and bubbleless economies and indicates the appearance of a bubble is welfare-
improving for both types of entrepreneurs. Intuitively, this comes from the
dierence in the rates of return. Without bubbles, L-entrepreneurs end up
with accumulating their wealth through a low return savings vehicle with
a rate of return of L=u0t . On the other hand, a bubble provides a high
rate of return vehicle for them, Pt+1=Pt. This increase in the rate of return
contributes to improving the net worth of entrepreneurs and their welfare.
4 Conclusion
We examined the eect of asset price bubbles in the Kiyotaki-Moore model.
We have shown that the dynamic interactions between bubble-asset price,
land price, and output generate powerful bubbly dynamics. The boom-bust
cycles in bubble-asset price cause boom-crash cycles in the land market si-
multaneously, like a contagion by aecting the fundamentals of land. We also
numerically analyzed the welfare eects of bubbles in transitional dynamics.
We have found that bubbles tend to be welfare-improving.
Our framework can be extended in several directions. Let us discuss one
of them here. In the above model, we have analyzed the interactions between
bubble-asset price and other asset prices in a closed economy. It would be
promising to include a two-country or a multi-country model. This would
enable analysis of how the boom-bust cycles of bubbles in one country have
contagious eects on asset prices in other countries. This analysis will be
important to understand the recent global nancial and debt crises across
countries.
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ects of the Boom-Bust of the Bubble-Asset Price
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
In the steady-state bubble economy, from (23), u is
u =
Hp
1   + p : (B1)
By substituting (B1) into (24), we can derive (26).
B Proof of Proposition 2
In order to prove Proposition 2, we rst characterize an equilibrium of the
bubbleless economy. When there is no bubble, the interest rate, user cost,
output, and wealth evolve over time as, respectively,
r0t =
L
u0t
; (A1)
qt = ut +
ut
L
qt+1(1  ) (A2)
Y 0t+1 =
H

(u0t)
1 K 0Ht +
L

(u0t)
1 K 0Lt ; (A3)
A0t+1 =
H
u0t
pA0t +
L
u0t
(1  p)A0t: (A4)
In the bubbleless economy, the interest rate equals the rate of return of L-
projects, so even L-entrepreneurs end up producing in equilibrium, which
means that K 0L  0 and Z 0L  0:
Given an initial condition, Y0, and Pt = 0 for all t  0; the perfect fore-
sight equilibrium path of the bubbleless economy is described by sequences
fqt; At; rt; ut; Ytg1t=o, satisfying (10), (22), and (A1)-(A4).
In the steady-state, the user cost is
u0 = Hp+ L(1  p): (A5)
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Condition (26) is equivalent to
u  u0: (A6)
This means that as long as bubbles can exist, the user cost in the steady-state
bubble economy is greater than that in the steady-state bubbleless economy.
Since u  u0 and KH  K 0H ; from (20) and (A3),
Y  Y 0: (A7)
Moreover, u  u0 and KH  K 0H mean
uKH

 u
0K 0H

: (A8)
Hence,
ZH  Z 0H ; (A9)
A  A0; (A10)
because in equilibrium, uKH= = ZH=1  = pA and u0K 0H= = Z 0H=1 
 = pA0 hold.
We also know that aggregate consumption is a fraction 1    of the
aggregate wealth. Hence,
C  C 0: (A11)
Aggregate TFP can be dened as
TFP  Y 
K

   Z
1 
1  ; TFP0  Y 0 K0

   Z0
1 
1  ; (A12)
where Z = ZH + ZL and Z 0 = Z 0H + Z 0L: Hence,
TFP = H  TFP0  
HZ 0H   LZ 0L
Z 0
: (A13)
C Proof of Proposition 3
By substituting (18), (22), and (23) into (21), we obtain
t = p+
   t
   t+1t+1(1  ); (C1)
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where t  qt=At:
Given a state variable Yt; there is a unique price path fqt; Ptg1t=0 where
t becomes constant over time and satises
 = p=: (C2)
Once t becomes constant, then we can derive (28)-(30) from (22) and (C2).
Using (18), (20) can be rewritten as
Yt+1 =
H

(pAt)
1  : (C3)
(C3) can be rearranged as (27) using (28), (29), and the denition of At.
Hence, the economy converges to the steadystate according to (27), and
(28)-(30). The initial values of fq0; P0g are determined so that the economy
gets on the saddle path.
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